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Right-wing populism as a social representation: A comparison across four European 
countries 
Abstract 
The rise of right-wing populist parties has been widely discussed across the social sciences 
during the last decade. Taking a social representational approach, we analyse organising 
principles and anchoring of right-wing populist thinking across four European countries 
(France, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK). Using European Social Survey data (Round 
7), we compare political attitudes and self-appraisals of citizens identifying with right-wing 
populist, conservative right-wing, and traditional left-wing parties. The findings converge 
across the four countries to show that right-wing populist identifiers diverge from both left- 
and right-wing identifiers on vertical (between the “people” and the “elite”) and horizontal 
(between nationals and immigrants) dimensions of differentiation. Depending on the context, 
right-wing populist identification was fuelled by material and physical insecurity, low 
political efficacy, and distrust of fellow citizens. We conclude that right-wing populism 
requires multiple strategies of differentiation within and between groups to justify and sustain 
itself. 
  
Right-wing populism as a social representation  3 
 
Right-wing populism as a social representation: A comparison across four European 
countries 
The xenophobic stance of right-wing populist parties, their mistrust of elites and 
institutions, as well as their provocative political style have been widely discussed and 
analysed in the aftermath of the great recession in 2008 that propelled populist parties to the 
forefront of European politics (e.g., Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016; Wodak, KhosraviNik & Mral, 
2013). Prior to this special issue, social psychological research has shown little explicit 
interest in this major political development. Although many recent studies in social 
psychology and related disciplines have examined support for far-right parties and 
movements, these studies have primarily focused on the role of anti-immigrant attitudes in 
far-right support (e.g., Green, Sarrasin, Baur, & Fasel, 2016; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; 
Rydgren, 2008). 
In this paper, we analyse right-wing populism as a social representation. We argue that 
right-wing populism attempts to restrict the representation of the nation to a tightly knit and 
morally superior group composed of like-minded citizens most commonly understood as 
“ordinary people” (Mols & Jetten, 2016). In order to reach this goal, it simultaneously values 
similarity, rejects difference, scorns elites, and devalues institutions. This representation of 
the nation has spread across contemporary European societies, but is also fiercely debated and 
contested (Golder, 2016). As such it is endorsed by some and rejected by others, an essential 
criterion to study a social object as a social representation (Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 1993). Adopting a classical social representations research paradigm (Moscovici, 1961 
/ 2008), we use representative survey data to compare political beliefs and self-appraisals of 
citizens identifying with a populist right-wing, a conservative right-wing, and a traditional 
left-wing party across four European countries. 
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 The social representational approach to populism put forward in this paper (a) 
demonstrates organising principles of this representation, (b) analyses the anchoring of the 
representation in citizens’ subjective realities and self-appraisals, (c) examines its specificity 
in relation to representations of the nation associated with traditional left- and right-wing 
idelogies, and (d) determines the extent of convergence of this representation across four 
national contexts.  
This social representational approach provides a unique contribution to the study of 
right-wing populism. First, it offers an integrative theoretical framework for a comparative 
understanding of the content, structure, and context of right-wing populist representations of 
the nation. Second, it provides a joint explanation of negative attitudes towards institutions 
and elites on the one hand (vertical differentiation), and on negative attitudes towards cultural 
difference on the other (horizontal differentiation). Extending the conclusions by Mols and 
Jetten (2016) to a cross-national, representative sample, we argue that the key process in 
populist thinking is the cumulation of multiple within- and between group strategies of 
differentiation. This paper thereby goes beyond the “cultural” demand side explanation of 
right-wing populist support that frequently focuses on anti-immigration attitudes (Golder, 
2016), neglecting the deeper motivation of believing in and belonging to an idealised and 
imagined nation (Anderson, 1983).  
 Organising principles of the populist representation 
Organising principles describe the core structure of a social representation and 
identify the content dimensions towards which individuals take a stance (Doise et al., 1993). 
Recent research suggests that generic differentiations between social categories (e.g., between 
“good” and “bad” people, between “winners” and “losers”) act as organising principles of 
different representations of social order (Mouffe, 1993; Staerklé, 2009; 2015; Staerklé, Likki 
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& Scheidegger, 2012). Relatedly, current sociological and political science accounts of 
populism (e.g., Golder, 2016; Kriesi, 2014; Judis, 2016; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 
2016) agree that right-wing populism is organised by a vertical and a horizontal dimension of 
differentiation between “us” and “them” (Brubaker, 2017). 
The vertical dimension of differentiation refers to the relation between “ordinary 
people” and the political and legal elite within a given country. Right-wing populists mobilise 
citizens with negative views of elites and institutions. The list of grievances against “those on 
top” of the society includes accusations of corruption and greed, failure to represent the 
interests of the “real people”, indifference to the economic struggles of ordinary people and 
condescendence towards their way of life (Rosanvallon, 2008). The democratic system is 
portrayed as unresponsive to people’s demands, and therefore thought to work better without 
institutional “intermediaries” between the government and the people such as political parties, 
media, and NGO’s (Müller , 2016). The populist leader appears as “rescuing” the people from 
the claws of immoral elites and dishonest and inefficient institutions, by giving them a voice 
and directly representing their interests in the political process. The vertical dimension of 
populism in essence asks for a democracy without institutions. 
The horizontal dimension of differentiation refers to the rejection of pluralism, in 
particular cultural pluralism. Right-wing populists construe a generic opposition between 
insiders and outsiders that is often tied to cultural differences. Insiders are “people like us”, 
whereas outsiders are those “who are said to threaten our way of life” (Brubaker, 2017, 
p.1192). Research has amply documented that rejection of cultural diversity is based, on the 
one hand, on symbolic threat whereby immigrant and refugee populations represent cultural 
otherness that is said to be incompatible with the values of an idealised and allegedly 
homogeneous national ingroup. On the other hand, nationals may experience material threat, 
considering that immigrants strip away ever scarcer job opportunities and abuse tax payer 
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money by claiming undue welfare benefits (Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006). An even more 
sweeping assertion by populist leaders holds that national majorities are actually victims of 
progressive multicultural policies that are said to unduly benefit cultural minorities (Mols & 
Jetten, 2016; Leach, Ayer & Pedersen, 2007). This horizontal dimension of differentiation has 
been interpreted as a backlash against the progressive, multicultural and economically liberal 
policies that have developed in Western countries since the 1970’s (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; 
Müller, 2016). 
In line with prior cross-national survey research on social representations (see Bauer & 
Gaskell, 2008), we focus our analysis on the organising principles of the representation (e.g., 
Doise, Spini & Clémence, 1999). For the populist representation of the nation, we expect both 
dimensions of vertical and horizontal differentiation to act as the joint organising principles of 
right-wing populism, that is, as the core dimensions of the populist identity that define its 
difference from traditional left- and right-wing identities.  
Anchoring  
Following a social representations approach, the populist representation of the nation 
is socially “anchored” in both objective and subjective realities of individuals (Doise et al., 
1993). Social anchoring describes the process through which a representation emanates from 
specific individual and social circumstances. While social position variables such as age, 
gender and education level describe objective realities that determine whether individuals 
identify with populist parties, subjective realities are captured by self-appraisals that give 
meaning to one’s social position. These subjective self-appraisals (e.g., feelings of insecurity 
and vulnerability) are a priori independent of the populist representation, but they have the 
potential to generate new representations and further their development and dissemination. 
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Accordingly, the second objective is to study the anchoring of the populist 
representation of the nation by examining the subjective factors that lead people to identify 
with right-wing populist parties. This approach is akin to the study of the demand side of 
populism that identifies the fears, grievances and beliefs that lead individuals to endorse 
populist representations of the nation (Golder, 2016; Rydgren, 2007). 
Many studies on populism have shown that economic grievances and disadvantaged 
social positions (mostly measured by low income, labour market precariousness and low 
education level) feed resentment towards elites and fuel scapegoating of immigrants (see 
Rydgren, 2007; 2008; Golder, 2016; Müller, 2016). Explanations in line with the 
modernization hypothesis interpret populism as a nostalgic reaction to value change in 
Western societies, leading to rejection of pluralism especially among men, older and less 
educated generations who see themselves as the losers of globalisation (Inglehart & Norris, 
2017). Other studies, however, have uncovered greater support for far-right parties among 
young respondents (see Green et al., 2016). We therefore expect male gender and low-status 
positions to predict right-wing populist identification, but leave open whether age has a 
positive or negative effect. 
In line with our social representational approach, we focus our anchoring analysis on 
predictors that examine the extent to which respondents’ subjective self-appraisal of their 
position in society determines identification with populist parties (Scheidegger & Staerklé, 
2011). When citizens feel abandoned and betrayed, they are prone to develop an ethos of 
insecurity, social isolation and mistrust (Castel, 2009). Many feel that social cohesion is 
declining as they no longer believe in a nation-wide moral community that enables them to 
trust each other (Larsen, 2013). Existential fears of insecurity, a sense of victimhood and an 
impression of lacking control over one’s life may then lead to the disenchantment with a 
political system unresponsive to concerns of ordinary people (Kinnvall, 2016). We therefore 
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expect populist identification to be associated with a subjective sense of fear and insecurity, 
with lacking trust in fellow citizens, and with a feeling of lacking political efficacy. 
Specificity  
The third objective is to establish the specificity of the populist representation of the 
nation in relation to traditional left- and right-wing representations. Based on classical social 
representations research that compares representations across different “social milieus” 
(Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Moscovici, 1961 / 2008), we compare citizens in each of the four 
countries who identify with a right-wing populist party, with a conservative right-wing party, 
and with a traditional left-wing party. We chose party identification because we want to study 
the populist representation with a subsample of respondents that unambiguously endorses 
populist beliefs. Political parties strive to offer coherent worldviews that define the political 
priorities of a society and identify its main problems and threats. Individuals who feel close to 
a political party are expected to recognise and endorse its worldviews (see Bartle & Bellucci, 
2009). 
Depending on the countries, populist parties may share positions with both types of 
mainstream parties (immigrant-hostile positions on the horizontal dimension of differentiation 
with right-wing parties; more extensive welfare coverage and institutional distrust on the 
vertical dimension of differentiation with left-wing parties). Our study explores whether the 
difference between right-wing populist and the respective mainstream party identifiers is of a 
quantitative (populist parties are on the far right of the left-right continuum) or of a qualitative 
nature (populist parties are different from both right- and left-wing parties).  
Cross-national convergence  
The fourth aim is to assess the cross-national convergence of representations across 
four European countries: France, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. A high degree of 
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convergence would signal that the organising principles of populist representations are 
common across countries, in spite of possible national specificities, thereby suggesting the 
presence of a widely shared and potentially influential form of social representation (Doise et 
al., 1999). 
Countries were selected on theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, each of 
these countries has witnessed the rise of a single populist right-wing party over the last one or 
two decades (Golder, 2016; Kriesi, 2014; Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016). Empirically, the number 
of respondents identifying with right-wing populist parties in these countries was sufficiently 
high (N > 130) to yield acceptable statistical power for the group comparisons. We consider 
that these four countries adequately capture the key processes underlying right-wing populist 
representations of the nation in Western Europe, thereby paving the way for a more general 
framework of right-wing populism as a social representation. 
Overview of the study 
We assess the organising principles of vertical differentiation with two sub-
dimensions (Institutional trust and System responsiveness) and horizontal differentiation with 
two sub-dimensions (Material immigrant threat and Cultural diversity threat). The anchoring 
variables include subjective self-appraisals measured with four sub-dimensions (Material 
insecurity, Physical insecurity, Interpersonal trust, and Political efficacy) as well as age, 
gender, education level, citizenship, income, and unemployment history as objective social 
position variables.  
The four objectives require different statistical tests and models. Organising principles 
and anchoring of the populist representation of the nation are evidenced with a hierarchical 
logistic regression analysis that accounts for the respective impact of social position variables, 
subjective self-appraisal and organising principles on populist identification. Specificity of the 
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populist representation, in turn, requires within-country party comparison, whereas 
convergence is based on a between-country national comparison of difference patterns 
between party identifiers. 
We first run an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on the four countries to compare, 
separately for each measure, the three social milieus of populist, right-wing and left-wing 
party identifiers on the four dimensions of subjective self-appraisal (anchoring variables) and 
on the four dimensions of vertical and horizontal differentiation (organising principles). 
Specificity is evidenced with differences between populist party identifiers and identifiers of 
both left- and right-wing parties. Convergence is evidenced when the difference pattern for 
the three party identifier categories is consistent across the four countries.  
Even though ANCOVA compares anchoring variables and organising principles as a 
function of party identification, it does not provide information on the relative importance of 
predictors of populist identification. We therefore ran a complementary logistic regression 
analysis across the four countries to examine the anchoring of right-wing populist 
identification in social positions and in self-appraisals, and to test the hypothesis that 
horizontal and vertical differentiation jointly act as organising principles of right-wing 
populism. This is evidenced when the two dimensions of differentiation decrease or override 
effects of positional and anchoring variables in explaining populist right-wing identification. 
The logistic regression analysis differs from ANCOVA as it (a) simultaneously assesses the 
relative importance of the various predictors of right-wing populist identification, (b) 
examines predictors of populist identification as opposed to both left- and right-wing party 
identification, and (c) analyses all four national contexts at the same time, thereby 
summarising the key effects across the four countries.  
Method 
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Participants and procedure 
We used data from the European Social Survey 2014 (Round 7), a large bi-annual 
international survey on social and political attitudes, from France (n = 1917), the Netherlands 
(n = 1919), Switzerland (n = 1532), and the UK (n = 2264), with an overall N = 7632. The 
data are representative of the population aged 16 years and older and were collected with 
computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI).1 
We restricted the sample to respondents who identify with the main right-wing 
populist party, with the main conservative right-wing party (championing to varying degrees 
economically liberal and immigrant-hostile policies), or with the main socialist or social-
democratic left-wing party (advocating to varying degrees inequality reduction and 
immigrant-friendly policies). Table 1 shows the respective parties for each country as well the 
number of respondents for each of them.2 
Mean age for the subsample of identifiers with the three respective parties was 53.7 
years (SD = 18.6) in France, 52.0 years (SD = 17.5) in the Netherlands, 50.3 years (SD 18.6) 
in Switzerland, and 56.7 years (SD = 17.5) in the UK. Male respondents made up 50.8% in 
France, 48.6% in the Netherlands, 55.0% in Switzerland, and 50.3% in the UK. The mean 
years of education was 12.7 in France, 13.4 in the Netherlands, 11.2 in Switzerland, and 13.3 
in the UK. Only small minorities were non-nationals in our subsample (FR: 25, 3.6%; NL: 8, 
1.8%; CH: 41, 7.5%; UK: 34, 3.6%).  
                                                             
1 Detailed information on sampling, data collection and cross-national comparative variables (e.g., income 
level) can be found at www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
2 Switzerland and the Netherlands have an electoral system with proportional representation in which the 
observed proportion of right-wing populist identifiers (27.3% and 12.5%, respectively) roughly corresponds to 
the parliamentary strength of populist parties during data collection in 2014 (26.6% in Switzerland, 10.0% in 
the Netherlands). In the UK and France, parliamentary elections are based on a single member election within 
constituencies that consequently minimises minority party representation in the respective parliaments. 
However, in the 2014 election for the European Parliament UKIP won 26.6% and the FN 24.8% of the national 
votes, making them the biggest parties in the respective national components of the European Parliament. 
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Measures3 
For party identification participants reported whether they “feel closer” to a particular 
political party than to all the other parties, and in case of a positive answer “Which one?”. 
Income level was measured with ten country-specific income range categories, each 
corresponding broadly to deciles of the actual household income range in each country.  
For unemployment history, respondents were asked whether they had ever been 
unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months (yes, no). 
Self-appraisals. Perceived material insecurity was assessed with a subjective 
evaluation of one’s household income. Responses ranged from (1) Living comfortably on …, 
(2) Coping on …, (3) Finding it difficult on …, to (4) Finding it very difficult on present 
income.  
Perceived physical insecurity was used as a proxy for a general sense of insecurity and 
measured with an item of perceived safety in public space (“walking alone in this area after 
dark”, 1 = very safe, 4 = very unsafe). 
Political efficacy assessed respondents’ perceived personal (in-)ability to participate in 
the political process, a dimension associated with political powerlessness. Political efficacy 
was measured with three items (e.g., How able [are you] to take an active role in a group 
involved with political issues?). Responses were given on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 
(Not at all able/confident/easy) to 10 (Completely able /confident/ Extremely easy), with 
higher means indicating higher efficacy. Preliminary principal components analyses showed 
that the three items loaded on a single factor in all four countries. Cronbach’s alpha of the 
composite score was .76 (FR), .86 (NL), .78 (CH), and .83 (UK).  
                                                             
3 Full description of all measures can be found in the supplementary material. 
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Interpersonal trust evaluated the perceived moral qualities of an unspecified, generic 
majority (“most people”). It thereby indicates generalised interpersonal trust, respectively, 
when reversed, distrust and possibly social isolation. Interpersonal trust was measured with 
three items (e.g., […] most people can be trusted, or […] you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?). Responses were given on an 11-point bi-polar scale ranging from 0 to 10, with 
higher means indicating higher trust. Preliminary principal components analyses showed that 
the three items loaded on a single factor in all four countries. Cronbach’s alpha was .62 (FR), 
.66 (CH), .71 (NL), and .77 (UK).  
Vertical differentiation. Institutional trust assessed (dis-)trust of political and legal 
institutions (i.e., “elites”) at the national level: (1) politicians; (2) [country’s] parliament; (3) 
political parties; and (4) the legal system. Responses were given on an 11-point scale ranging 
from 0 (No trust at all) to 10 (Complete trust), with higher means indicating higher trust. 
Preliminary principal components analyses showed that the four items loaded on a single 
factor in all four countries. Cronbach’s alpha was .85 (FR), .90 (NL), .85 (CH), and .88 (UK).  
System responsiveness evaluated agreement with the claim put forward by populists 
that the “government” is insensitive to people’s demands and needs. It was measured with 
three items (e.g., How much [does] the political system in [country] allow people like you to 
have a say in what the government does?). Responses were given on an 11-point scale ranging 
from 0 (Not at all) to 10 (Completely), with higher means indicating higher responsiveness. 
Preliminary principal components analyses showed that the three items loaded on a single 
factor in all four countries. Cronbach’s alpha was .78 (FR), .85 (NL), .77 (CH), and .83 (UK). 
This measure represents a judgement on the responsiveness (and thus legitimacy) of the 
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political system, whereas the measure of political efficacy taps the personal ability to 
intervene in this system.4 
Horizontal differentiation. Material immigrant threat measured perceived job 
competition and social scrounging from immigrants. It was assessed with three items (e.g., 
[…] people who come to live here […] take jobs away […], or […] help to create new jobs?). 
Responses were given on a bi-polar 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10. Cronbach’s alpha 
was .71 (FR), .72 (NL), .63 (CH), and .80 (UK). 
Cultural diversity threat taps opposition to multiculturalism and support for 
assimilationism, and was assessed with three items (e.g., Is [country]’s cultural life 
undermined or enriched by people coming to live here […]?). For items 1 and 2 (see 
Appendix), responses were given on a bi-polar 11-point scale; for item 3 the response scale 
was from 1 (Agree strongly) to 5 (Disagree strongly). Cronbach’s alpha was .65 (FR), .63 
(NL), .62 (CH), and .69 (UK). Due to the different response scales, the six material immigrant 
threat and cultural diversity threat items were standardised and recoded such that higher 
means indicate greater perceived threat.5 
Results 
All analyses were carried out with SPSS 24.0. We first present ANCOVA results that 
establish specificity and convergence of populist representations. Second, we report findings 
of a binary logistic regression analysis that examines the cross-national anchoring of the 
                                                             
4 Preliminary principal components analyses showed that the six items of the measures of political efficacy and 
system responsiveness loaded on two separate factors in all four countries. Correlations between the two 
indicators were r = .64 (FR), r = .76 (NL), r = .55 (CH), and r = .69 (UK). 
5 Preliminary principal components analyses showed that the six items of the measures of material immigrant 
threat and cultural diversity threat loaded on a single factor in all four countries. Nevertheless, extensive 
research on the differences between material and symbolic immigrant threat (Riek et al., 2006) as well as the 
continuous public debate involving different arguments related to both material and identity-based threat led 
us to keep the two dimensions separate for the purpose of our analyses.  
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populist representation (Models 1 and 2) and demonstrates its organising principles (Model 
3). 
Specificity and convergence 
We performed separate ANCOVAS for each of the eight anchoring and organising 
principle variables, with Country (France vs. Netherlands vs. Switzerland vs. UK) and Party 
identification (Populist vs. Right-wing vs. Left-Wing party identification) as between-subjects 
variables. Table 2 shows the F statistics and effect sizes of the three effects of interest 
(Country, Party and Country x Party). Since we are not concerned with overall country or 
party means, these are not reported. 
Table 2 shows that all effects were significant, suggesting that the overall means of the 
four countries differed on all dimensions, and so did the means of the populist, right-wing and 
left-wing identifiers. Moreover, party differences were qualified by the national context. 
Effect sizes (partial eta squared) were largest for country variation of institutional trust and 
system responsiveness (vertical differentiation dimensions), for party variation of institutional 
trust, and for party variation of material immigrant threat and cultural diversity threat 
(horizontal differentiation dimensions). 
Table 3 presents the estimated ANCOVA means for the three groups defined by party 
identification, corrected for age, gender and education level in order to control for 
compositional effects of the representative samples. Two simple contrasts tested the mean 
difference between populist identifiers one the one hand, and right-wing and left-wing 
identifiers on the other. 
Self-appraisals. For material insecurity, contrast analyses revealed that populist 
identifiers felt more materially insecure than right-wing identifiers across the four countries, 
and more insecure than left-wing identifiers in France and (marginally) in the Netherlands. 
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For physical insecurity, contrast analyses revealed that populist identifiers felt physically 
more insecure than left-wing identifiers in France, and more insecure than right-wing 
identifiers in the UK. In the Netherlands, populist identifiers felt more insecure than both 
other categories. For interpersonal trust, contrast analyses show that in France, the 
Netherlands and the UK populist identifiers were more distrusting of fellow citizens than both 
left- and right-wing identifiers. In Switzerland, the difference was significant only with left-
wing identifiers. For political efficacy, finally, contrast effects revealed that in France, the 
Netherlands, and the UK populist identifiers felt less able and less competent to participate in 
the political process than both left- and right-wing identifiers. In Switzerland, only the 
difference with right-wing identifiers was significant.  
These four self-appraisal analyses suggest that populist identifiers across the four 
countries do experience greater powerlessness than left- and right-wing identifiers. They also 
trust their fellow citizens less than the other two categories. They often experience greater 
physical and material insecurity, though with lower convergence across countries. 
Vertical differentiation. Contrast analyses for institutional trust reveal that populist 
identifiers were more distrustful of political institutions than both right- and left-wing 
identifiers across the four countries. Findings for system responsiveness show a largely 
similar pattern as populist identifiers differed from both right- and left-wing identifiers across 
all contexts. Revealing both specificity and cross-national convergence, populist identifiers 
across the four countries engaged in greater vertical differentiation, compared to individuals 
identifying with the main right- or left-wing parties. Populist identifiers in France and the UK 
were particularly distrustful of institutions and wary about the responsiveness of the system, 
compared to more trusting Dutch and, even more so, Swiss populist identifiers.  
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Horizontal differentiation. Contrast effects for perceived material immigrant threat 
reveal that populist identifiers reported massively greater material immigrant threat than both 
right-wing and left-wing identifiers across the four contexts. The pattern for perceived 
cultural diversity threat was similar to the one of material threat. These findings in turn 
provide evidence for the specificity and convergence of the right-wing populist position 
towards horizontal differentiation. 
Anchoring and organising principles  
In order to examine the anchoring and organising principles of populist identification, 
we ran a hierarchical binary logistic regression analysis on populist party identification (as 
opposed to combined left- and right-wing party identification) (Table 4). Since in this paper 
we do not focus on country differences of predictors of populist party identification, we 
pooled the data for the four countries, and entered them in the model as main effect dummy 
variables (with Netherlands as the reference category).  
The findings for Model 1 (with country and positional variables) first revealed a 
compositional effect of the sample showing that there were relatively less populist party 
identifiers (among the three party-identifier categories under scrutiny) in France and the UK, 
compared to Switzerland and the Netherlands. More importantly, and controlling for country 
variation, men and younger respondents were more likely to identify with right-wing populist 
parties6, much like respondents with a lower level of education, with lower income and those 
with national citizenship. Unemployment history did not play a role. 
                                                             
6 We also explored the curvilinear relationship between age and populist identification. In a model with 
country, gender, age and education level as control variables, entering the squared version of the (centered) 
age variable increased explained variance (B = -.0003, SE = .0001, p = .025), suggesting an inverted U 
relationship in addition to the linear effect. Inspection of the probability curve of identifying with right-wing 
populist parties as a function of five-year age categories reveals, however, a more complex age pattern: the 
general linear trend showing decreasing populist identification with age is inverted between ages 20 and 25 
when identification increases from 29.7% to 38.9%, before dropping sharply around the age of 35 (from 38.9% 
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 Self-appraisal anchoring variables were added in Model 2. Perceived material 
insecurity was unrelated to populist identification, whereas a positive association was found 
for perceived physical insecurity. Both low interpersonal trust and low political efficacy were 
associated with populist identification. All positional effects remained significant after 
entering the self-appraisals in the model.  
In Model 3, we added the organising principles of vertical and horizontal 
differentiation. For vertical differentiation, institutional distrust predicted populist 
identification, and so did low system responsiveness. As for horizontal differentiation, the 
findings revealed strong effects for both material immigrant threat and cultural diversity 
threat. After entering the four dimensions of vertical and horizontal differentiation in the 
model, the positional effects remained significant, with the exception of national citizenship 
that was no longer associated with populist party identification. Self-appraisal effects, 
however, disappeared completely, suggesting that the organising principles of vertical and 
horizontal differentiation overrode the effects of physical insecurity, interpersonal trust and 
political efficacy on populist party identification.7  
Discussion 
In this study, we analysed right-wing populism as a social representation across four 
European countries, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. Based on classical 
social representation research (Moscovici, 1961 / 2008), we adopted a novel approach for the 
study of right-wing populism by cross-nationally comparing populist party identifiers with 
those identifying with traditional left- and right-wing parties.  
                                                             
to 19.4%), and then rising again to expected levels around age 50 (30.2%). Possible age-gender interactions 
were also explored, but no significant effects were found. 
7 We ran the logistic regression also with a single threat indicator. While its effect was strong (B = 1.56, S.E. = 
.11, Wald = 223.52, p < .001), all other effects in the model remained identical in essence. 
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Specificity and convergence  
The ANCOVA difference patterns between the three party identifier categories reveal 
the specificity of populist representations compared to traditional left- and right-wing 
representations. Cross-national examination of these patterns provide an indication of their 
convergence across the four countries. 
For horizontal differentiation, traditional right-wing identifiers (RW) were 
consistently located between right-wing populists (POP) and traditional left-wing party 
identifiers (LW), producing a POP – RW – LW sequence. The overall similarity of results 
regarding cultural and material immigrant threat further suggests that in respondents’ heads, 
the difference between these two forms of perceived threat is hardly relevant (see also Golder, 
2016; Green & Staerklé, 2013). 
For vertical differentiation, however, assessed with institutional trust and system 
responsiveness, left-wing identifiers were located between the other two groups (POP – LW – 
RW) in Switzerland and the UK. The relatively large effect sizes for overall country 
differences further suggest that cross-national differences are important on this vertical 
dimension of differentiation. Right-wing populism is therefore not simply an extreme form of 
right-wing conservatism (that is, quantitatively different), but—depending on the national 
context—may combine elements of both right-wing and left-wing political disourse. It should 
therefore be considered as qualitatively different from mainstream political ideologies. 
To sum up, populist party identifiers in all four contexts set themselves apart from 
both left- and right-wing supporters on the joint organising principles of vertical and 
horizontal differentiation, providing evidence for the specificity of right-wing populist 
representations of the nation. And even though the interaction effects between country and 
party were significant, their effect sizes appear to be minor compared to the large main effects 
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of party, especially for horizontal differentiation. These findings further underscore the often 
extreme, yet convergent political positioning of European right-wing populist party identifiers 
on both dimensions of differentiation. Future research should nevertheless analyse in more 
detail the underlying reasons and the possible social psychological implications of these 
country differences (see Wodak et al, 2013, for a detailed analysis of country differences of 
right-wing populism).  
Anchoring 
Model 1 of the hierarchical logistic regression analysis in turn revealed that the 
prototypical right-wing populist identifier is a 25-34 year old male with a low level of 
education and with a low income holding a national passport, thereby largely confirming prior 
research on the demand side of right-wing populism (Rydgren, 2007; Müller, 2016). It is 
noteworthy that the negative effect of age was largely unaffected by the introduction of self-
appraisals and organising principles in models 2 and 3, suggesting that factors other than 
those assessed in our study are responsible for this effect. This finding runs counter common-
sense conceptions of right-wing populism that is more often associated with “angry, old men” 
than with the younger generations. It is also at odds with a generational value conflict 
explanation (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). At the same time, other research has also uncovered 
this effect (see Golder, 2016; Green et al, 2016). Many recent (and not necessarily right-wing 
populist) political developments have been explained by a strong involvement of disillusioned 
young generations, for example the Labour party success in the 2017 UK General Election 
(Young, 2018), or the 2017 electoral success of the far-right Austrian People’s party under the 
leadership of 31-year old Sebastian Kurz. Age therefore seems to play a complex and 
ambivalent role in explaining support for right-wing populism. Our additional analyses indeed 
revealed a complex curvilinear pattern according to which the cohort aged 25 to 34 in 
particular was overrepresented among right-wing populist identifiers. One interpretation of 
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this finding is that around the age of 25, many young people may realise a gap between their 
expectations and the reality of their precarious and uncertain lives, leading to disillusionment 
and the search for certainty and positive identity found in populist discourse. Future research 
should examine the specific reasons that explain why younger voters are attracted to right-
wing populist representations of the nation. Longitudinal analyses may disentangle age and 
cohort effects. 
The results of model 2 show that populist identifiers, controlling for positional 
variables, felt politically more powerless relative to the other two categories, expressed lower 
trust in fellow citizens, and felt physically more insecure. This generalised social distrust 
associated with pervasive feelings of insecurity may be symptomatic of a perceived 
breakdown of social cohesion, stability and continuity (Rosanvallon, 2008). Yet, the positive 
relationship with interpersonal distrust does not necessarily mean that right-wing populism is 
the outcome of social alienation and isolation, an explanation of populism that has received 
little empirical support (Rydgren, 2007). Instead, we suspect that it indicates a defensive and 
self-protective worldview that motivates citizens to affiliate themselves with similar and 
therefore trustworthy others in a safe and irrefutably superior, but fictitious national ingroup. 
 Political powerlessness prevalent for this category further suggests that the populist 
representation is marked by lacking political legitimacy and a sense of victimisation. This 
interpretation is in line with the conjecture that populism is a form of “inverted” identity 
politics (Müller, 2016) in which populist leaders portray “ordinary people” as a victimised 
majority, betrayed by elites who allegedly reserve better treatment for immigrants (Mols & 
Jetten, 2016). Populist leaders seem to denounce a broken social contract between the rulers 
and the ruled, a contract that in their view can only be revalidated with the help of a strong 
leader who directly represents their values and interests.  
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Material insecurity was the only self-appraisal variable that was no longer a 
significant predictor of populist identification in the regression analysis, compared to the 
univariate ANCOVA that showed that populist identifiers were more materially insecure than 
most of their left- and right-wing counterparts. This finding suggests that the relationship 
between material insecurity and populist identification is partially accounted for by positional 
variables such as income and education level. 
Organising principles 
Consistent with the large effect sizes found for the effect of party identification on the 
four measures of vertical and horizontal differentiation, model 3 of the logistic regression 
analysis revealed that when the effects of social position and self-appraisals were controlled 
for, both vertical and horizontal differentiation remained by far the most important predictors 
of right-wing populist identification. Moreover, they cancelled out the effects of self-
appraisals, suggesting that right-wing populism is first of all driven by a desire for 
differentiation and positive group membership. These findings confirm that vertical 
differentiation (between “ordinary people” and authorities/institutions) and horizontal 
differentiation (between nationals and immigrants) jointly act as organising principles of the 
populist representation of the nation. 
Limits 
This study has several shortcomings that must be acknowledged. First, the selection of 
countries induces specific interpretations of the social representation of populism. The 
inclusion of other countries with recent surges of right-wing populism (such as Hungary, 
Austria, or the U.S.) would possibly lead to new insights regarding the anchoring of populist 
representations. However, given the cross-national consistency of the organising principles, 
we are confident that the four countries under scrutiny capture the essential dynamics 
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underlying populist representations of the nation, at least in Western Europe. Second, there 
are limits concerning the data themselves. While European Social Survey data are often 
considered the best available cross-national survey data, the internal consistency of some 
indicators was not satisfying and therefore potentially unstable. More importantly, measures 
of the key concepts used in our approach can be improved. Even though we believe that 
negative attitudes towards institutions and immigrants necessarily imply (negative) 
differentiation, future research should devise less evaluative measures of differentiation. 
Similarly, the vertical dimension of differentiation was measured only through attitudes 
towards (political) institutions and authorities. Future research should include measures 
relating to distrust in (economic, intellectual and cultural) elites more generally that often 
features in accounts of populism (Golder, 2016). 
Conclusion 
Our findings suggest that right-wing populism relies on a coherent social 
representation of the nation that is shared across the four countries. The national ingroup is 
represented as a culturally and normatively homogeneous group of upright citizens 
embodying the nation’s purported founding values (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). In order to 
sustain representations of a “pure” ingroup, cultural outgroups become necessarily 
threatening in the populist worldview. Put otherwise, since the generalised rejection of 
difference is constitutive of the populist representation of the nation, diversity threat does not 
require any empirical justification: the representation of belonging to a tightly knit 
(“entitative”, Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000) and morally superior national 
ingroup is sufficient (see Brewer, 1999). Future research should examine the extent to which 
this belongingness hypothesis is able to account for right-wing populism across European and 
other countries. 
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Maybe the most striking feature of these findings is that right-wing populism 
cumulates virtually all possible forms of exclusionary differentiation: it not only leads to a 
distancing from immigrants, but also from institutions, authorities, and fellow citizens. 
Interpersonal similarity freed from institutional constraints becomes the sole basis of a valid 
social bond, whereas difference—within and between groups—is by definition negative and 
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Table 1 
Sub-sample descriptives for France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK 






France (FR) Front National (FN) 155 15.8 
Union pour un 
mouvement 
populaire (UMP) 







People’s Party for 
Freedom and 
Democracy (VDD) 




Party (SVP) 217 27.3 
Radical-Liberal 
Party 114 14.4 
Socialist 





Party (UKIP) 166 14.2 
Conservative Party 
(Tories) 373 32.0 
Labour 
Party 415 35.6 211 18.1 1165 
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Table 2 
ANCOVA: F statistics and effect sizes of between-subjects factors Country and Party 
 Country Party Country x Party 
 F(3, 2596) ηp2 F(2, 2596) ηp2 F(6, 2596) ηp2 
Anchoring (Self-appraisals)       
Material insecurity 42.73*** .047 28.36*** .021 7.21*** .016 
Physical insecurity 28.36*** .032 12.73*** .010 7.44*** .017 
Interpersonal trust 51.22*** .056 37.27*** .028 5.13*** .012 
Political efficacy 91.28*** .095 19.47*** .015 3.43** .008 
Organising principles       
Vertical differentiation       
Institutional trust 174.70*** .168 183.08*** .124 20.26*** .045 
System responsiveness 211.16*** .196 111.10*** .079 11.41*** .026 
Horizontal differentiation       
Material immigrant threat 62.31*** .067 255.97*** .165 4.02*** .009 
Cultural diversity threat 76.83*** .082 280.81*** .178 5.84*** .013 
Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10. 
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Table 3 







Pop Right Left 
 
Pop Right Left 
 
Pop Right Left 
 
Pop Right Left 
Anchoring (Self-appraisals)               
Material insecurity 2.05 1.79*** 1.72***  1.85 1.48*** 1.68+  1.42 1.25* 1.53  1.90 1.58*** 1.97 
Physical insecurity 2.25 2.17 1.88***  2.17 1.90** 1.89**  1.76 1.71 1.70  2.22 1.90*** 2.15 
Interpersonal trust 4.40 5.07*** 5.60***  5.33 6.19*** 6.15***  5.89 6.16 6.27*  5.30 5.87*** 5.67* 
Political efficacy 3.32 3.92** 4.28***  3.35 4.02** 4.25**  5.57 6.09* 5.63  3.59 4.53*** 4.05* 
Organising principles                
Vertical differentiation                
Institutional trust 2.48 3.85*** 4.60***  3.55 5.74*** 5.86***  5.49 6.21*** 5.99**  2.91 5.20*** 4.37*** 
System responsiveness 2.10 3.05*** 3.82***  3.10 4.78*** 4.96***  5.15 6.20*** 5.78***  2.60 4.40*** 3.67*** 
Horizontal differentiation                
Material immigrant threat 0.86 0.19*** -0.24***  0.63 0.08*** -0.20***  0.13 -0.34*** -0.61***  0.83 0.05*** -0.09*** 
Cultural diversity threat 0.91 0.31*** -0.25***  0.37 .00*** -0.34***  0.28 -0.09*** -0.57***  0.94 0.28*** 0.05*** 
Note: Significance levels in the Right-wing columns refer to contrast 1 (Populist vs. Right-wing), and in the Left-wing columns to contrast 2 (Populist vs. 
Left-wing). Populist identifier means are in italics. 
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Table 4 
Binary logistic regression analysis on populist party identification across four national contexts 
(N = 2384) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Countriesa       
Switzerland .13 .16 .44** .17 .96*** .20 
France -.56*** .15 -.74*** .16 -1.39*** .19 
UK -.75*** .15 -.82*** .16 -1.58*** .19 
Social position       
Female -.37*** .10 -.49*** .11 -.41** .13 
Age -.02*** .00 -.02*** .01 -.03*** .00 
Education -.14*** .02 -.12*** .02 -.09*** .02 
National citizenship .91** .29 .91** .30 .20 .34 
Unemployment history .16 .12 .07 .12 .16 .14 
Income -.12*** .02 -.10** .02 -.12*** .03 
Anchoring (Self-appraisals)       
  Material insecurity   .04 .08 -.14 .09 
  Physical insecurity   .17* .07 .01 .08 
  Interpersonal trust   -.22*** .03 .02 .04 
  Political efficacy   -.10*** .03 .05 .03 
Organising principles       
  Vertical differentiation       
    Institutional trust     -.27*** .04 
    System responsiveness     -.09* .04 
  Horizontal differentiation       
    Material immigrant threat     .73*** .10 
    Cultural diversity threat     .84*** .10 
R2 Nagelkerke .16  .21  .44  
Note: a Netherlands is the reference country category. 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. 
 
